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AmONG the innovations in American jurisprudence resulting from the econ-
omic stresses of the nineteen-thirties, probably none has been more strange
to the courts than that expressed in former Sections 75, 77 and 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act, which treat the bankruptcy process not primarily as a method
of liquidating the property of the debtor, but of salvaging and conserving the
debtor's business enterprise. Of the three, Section 75,1 designed to relieve
the hard-pressed farmer, has been accorded the stormiest reception. Originally
passed in 19332 to facilitate composition agreements between farmer and
creditor, it proved so ineffective that Congress in the succeeding year saw fit
to bolster the act by the addition of subsection 75(s), the Frazier-Lemke
Farm Moratorium Act.3 But the compulsory five-year extension of debts,
the scaling down of mortgage debts to the appraised value of the security,
and other elements composing this subsection were found by the Supreme
Court to constitute a taking of the creditors' property without due process
of law.4 Congress hastily amended the act,' softening its provisions sufficiently
to gain the acquiescence of the Supreme Court ;G and later the operation of
the amended act was extended to March 4, 1940.7 Although the basic scheme
of the law has been sustained, many of its features have been severely battered
on the rocks of judicial interpretation, partly because of inherent obscurity in
the phrasing of the statute and partly because of an unduly strict and in some
cases apparently hostile attitude on the part of the courts. Perhaps as a
result, in over two years less than one per cent of the nation's farmers, accord-
ing to estimate, have taken advantage of Section 75.8
The provisions of the statute and the question of its constitutionality have
been the subject of extensive analysis and comment elsewhere9 and will not
be treated here. But in view of the practical certainty that Congress will feel
compelled to continue to relieve the farmer from the severities of a creditor
economy, either by the further extension of the present Section 75 or by some
other very similar means, it seems profitable to indicate the areas where the
1. 47 STAT. 1470 (1933), amended, 48 STAT. 1289 (1934), 49 STAT. 942 (1935),
52 STAT. 84, 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (Supp. 1938).
2. 47 STAT. 1470 (1933).
3. 48 STAT. 1289 (1934).
4. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
5. 49 STAT. 942 (1935).
6. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440 (1937).
7. 52 STAT. 84 (1938).
8. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Banl:ruptcy of the House Judicary
Committee on S. 2215 and H. R. 645. Dec. 17-18, 1937 and Jan. 5-7, 1938, cited hereafter
as Hearings, p. 46. See also note 96, infra.
9. Diamond and Letzler, The ANez, Fraieer-Lenke .4et: .4 S1t1dy1 (1937) 37 CoL
L. Ray. 1092; (1937) 37 CoL L. REv. 1005; (1937) 32 Ir. L. REv. 239; (1937) 23 VA.
L. Rav. 944; (1938) 23 Mncx. L. REv. 371.
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legislative intent has apparently been defeated, and to hazard an explanation
of these reversals.
The procedure established by the Act may be briefly summarized. A farmer
in distress may file a petition for relief in a district court, and thereupon all
proceedings against him, as well as the running of any period of redemption
where his mortgage has already been foreclosed, are stayed.10 The court
refers the petition to a conciliation commissioner, who attempts to work out
a plan of "equitable and feasible" liquidation for secured creditors and "finan-
cial rehabilitation" for the debtor." If such a plan is accepted by the creditors,
and if the court is satisfied that the proceedings have been conducted in "good
faith," the plan is confirmed. 12 But if the creditors will not agree to a plan,
or if the debtor is "aggrieved" by the plan confirmed, the Frazier-Lemke Act
comes into operation. The debtor files an amended petition, asking for adjudi-
cation as a bankrupt.13 He is thereupon entitled to a three year stay of all
proceedings, and to an appraisal of his property. He must pay into court
a semi-annual rental, equivalent to the customary rental in the locality, from
which taxes and interest must be met; and he is subject to certain discre-
tionary powers of the court, designed to safeguard the creditor's security. 14
At the end of the three years, or at any time in the interim, he may receive
a discharge in bankruptcy by paying into court the appraised value of the
farm ;15 but at any time that such a payment is offered, the dreditor may force
a judicial sale. If the debtor is unable to.refinance himself within three years,
the court may order the proceedings terminated.'
Two or three difficulties raised by the lower courts have already been
removed by action of Congress or the Supreme Court, and need only briefly
be noted here. The definition of those who may take advantage of the act
has been broadened, in the face of a tendency in the lower courts to a narrow
construction.Y7 As the statute was originally worded,' it failed to convince
10. BANKRUPTCy Acr § 75(c), (n), (o), 47 STAT. 1470 (1933), as amended 49 STAT.
942 (1935), 11 U.S.C.A. §203(c), (n), (o) (Supp. 1938).
11. § 75(b), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i).
12. §75(i), (j), (k).
13. §75(s).
14. §75(s) (2).
15. Either creditor or debtor may call for a re-appraisal at any time, if he tlinks
the one fixed at the outset of the stay no longer represents the true value of the property.
§ 75 (s) (3).
16. § 75(s) (3).
17. The statute was amended [49 STAT. 246 (1935)] to cover dairy farmerq and
livestock and poultry producers. The Supreme Court has held that the debtor must,
as the statute provides, be "personally engaged" in the enumerated operation, or deriving
the principal part of his income from them, but that he need not meet both requirements.
First National Bank v. Beach, 301 U. S. 435 (1937) ; see Comment (1938) 4 Onio SrATn
L. J. 347.
18. "The filing of a petition . . . shall subject the farmer and his property . . .
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court." § 75(n).
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many courts that property already sold under foreclosure proceedings was
within the compass of the act, for they held that the right to redeem was an
insufficient property interest to support bankruptcy proceedings."' Congress
therefore amended the statute to clarify the point.20 But the courts promptly
countered with decisions that the extension of the redemption period involved
in the stays granted was unconstitutional, in that it took the creditor's property
without due process of law, and interfered with property rights established
by state law.21 These decisions have now been reversed by the Supreme
Court.2 2 Mr. Justice Reed declared that the tolling of the redemption period
is a regulation of the debtor-creditor relationship implicit in the bankruptcy
power, and that state-fixed property rights might be altered in this manner
provided they were not destroyed.2 3
Elsewhere the attempts of Congress to avoid particular difficulties have
failed. Thus, legislative efforts to answer the question as to when proceed-
ings against the debtor are automatically stayed and when he must have a
court order to stay them24 have not cleared away the confusion. The settled
federal rule is now that the filing of the first petition automatically stays
proceedings, as provided in subsection (o), but that after "disposition" oi
the petition a judicial stay must be obtained.2 It is not clear, however,
whether action by the Conciliation Commissioner can constitute "disposition,"
or whether the filing of the amended petition marks the expiration of the
19. In re Knauft, 10 F. Supp. 785 (N. D. Cal. 1935); In re Chaboya, 9 F. Supp.
174 (S. D. Cal. 1934); cf. In re Nelson, 9 F. Supp. 657 (D. S. D. 1935); In re Faber,
11 F. Supp. 555 (D. Wash. 1935). Contra: In re Kalina, 9 F. Supp. 170 (D. Neb. 1935).
20. "The filing of a petition . . . shall subject the farmer and all his property
. .. including the right or the equity of redemption . . . to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the court. The period of redemption . . . shall be extended . . . for the period
necessary for the carrying out of the purposes of this section. ' §75(n).
21. In re Lowmon, 79 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) ; In re Wright, 91 F. (2d)
894 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; cf. In re Nossman, 22 F. Supp. 645 (D. Kan. 1938). Contra:
Hoyd v. Citizen's Bank of Albany, 89 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).
22. Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502 (1938). rcv'q. In re Wright,
91 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
23. The Court also held that the filing of the amended petition constituted "adjudica-
tion," and was the "line of cleavage" which determined how much of the debtor's property
was within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, some of the land having been can-
veyed to him after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. Ibid.
24. § 75(n) provides that the filing of a petition shall subject the farmer and all
his property, including contracts for purchase, contracts for sale, and equities of redemp-
tion to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court. A separate paragraph provides that the
period of redemption shall be extended as long as necessary for the purpnses of the
section. Subsection (o) lists six types of proceedings vhich "shall not he instituted
. . . or maintained." Paragraph 2 of subsection (s) provides that after the amended
petition is filed and the conditions of paragraph 1 are complied with, the court shall
order a stay of all proceedings.
25. Hardt v. Kirkpatrick, 91 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. d 'nd, 303
U. S. 626 (1938) ; In re Price, 99 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) : cf. In re Pate, (i9 F.
(2d) 694 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
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automatic stay.2 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has ruled that there is no
automatic stay at all, 27 on the ground that purchasers at a judicial sale without
notice of an automatic stay should not be burdened with the risk that the
sale might be illegal. While this argument is plausible, 2 8 internal evidence
in the statute29 seems to indicate that the Federal rule is the better expression
of the legislative intention."0 It is true that due care on the part of the debtor's
attorney in getting a judicial stay at all points will adequately protect the
debtor, but presumably those sought to be protected will not have the best
of legal advice.
Perhaps the most ill-fated of all the provisions of subsection (s) has been
paragraph 5. In the first place, it was there provided that "Any farm debtor
who has filed under the General Bankruptcy Act may take advantage of this
section upon written request to the court; and a previous discharge of the
debtor .under any other section of this act shall not be grounds for denying
him the benefit of this section."'' a Extrinsic evidence is lacking as to the
intention of Congress in framing this sentence. But it appears to have been
uniformly held, contrary to the first impression received from the words of
the statute, that a proceeding already commenced in general bankruptcy can-
26. Compare In re Cresap, C. C. H. BANKR. SERV. 51, 445 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938)
with Hardt v. Kirkpatrick, 91 F. (2d) 875 (C. C.A. 9th, 1937); cf. in re Rank, 9 F.
Supp. 171 (D. Neb. 1934). Obviously the stay must terminate upon the failure of the
composition proceedings if the debtor does not amend. The statute does not fix an exact
time within which an amended petition must be filed, and it is therefore not clear how
long after the failure of the negotiations the stay extends.
27. 'Kalb v. Luce, 279 N. W. 685, 280 N. W. 725 (Wis. 1938), dismissed for want
of final judgment by U. S. Supreme Court, Oct. 24, 1938 (59 Sup. Ct. 107). The earlier
opinion is grounded on what seems an erroneous reading of Hardt v. Kirkpatrick, 91 F.
(2d) 875 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), but the later one shifts to public policy for its principal
support. It may be noted that the debtor's relief would have been barred even tinder
the Federal rule, because his automatic stay had expired, so that the Wisconsin court's
ruling is not necessary under the facts of the case.
28. The automatic stay would not appear on the abstract of title, as a judicial stay
would.
29. The passive tense employed in subsection (o) ("The following proccedingq shall
not be instituted . . . or maintained"), and the fact that, if the stay there provided is
not automatic, subsection (o) is superfluous in view of the judicial stay provided in
subsection (n), tell against the view taken by the Wisconsin court.
30. There seems no justification, however, for the extension of the Hardt 7,. Kirk-
patrick rule made in In rc Cox, 22 F. Supp. 925 (D. Idaho 1938). In that ease a debtor
who filed her original petition two days before the expiration of the redemption period,
but when filing her amended petition neglected to get an express order from the court
staying the running of the redemption period, lost her property upon the expiration of
two days. The ruling maintains that the running of the period of redemption is a "pro-
ceeding" stayed by subsection (o) only until the disposition of the original petition; but
since a separate part of the statute is responsible for extending the redemption period,
there seems no valid reason of policy or logic why the cessation of the automatic stay
should operate with respect to the redemption period.
31. 49 STAT. 945 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §203(s)(5) (Supp. 1936).
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not, after adjudication, be transformed into a Section 75 proceeding.Y- The
reason given is that, when his property has once come into the possession
of the trustee in general bankruptcy, the debtor no longer owns property
sufficient to support proceedings under Section 75 ;33 while to interfere with
the rights of the creditors which vest when the trustee takes title would
violate the Fifth Amendment.34 Some courts have held, however, that the
acquisition of property after adjudication in general bankruptcy will enable
the debtor to maintain the two kinds of proceeding simultaneously,3 3 and
one court has allowed the debtor to maintain Section 75 proceedings with
regard to property abandoned by the trustee, where the mortgagee has not
proceeded to acquire vested rights therein.30 While the majority rule seems
firmly established, the purpose of Section 75 was to preserve the debtor's
interest in his land and promote individual ownership; and the effect of the
rule is to save for a general bankrupt only that land which lie acquires after
adjudication. Further, such a restriction seems to make the statutory pro-
vision almost superfluous, for the debtor could presumably enjoy Section 75
relief for after-acquired land even in the absence of such a provision.
The question of the effect of a previous discharge has not been extensively
litigated, but in one case the court declared that a previous discharge would be
grounds for denying no benefits except another discharge within six years37
The words of paragraph 5 make no such exception in denying any effect to
a previous discharge; but the court does not mention paragraph 5 in its
opinion, for it apparently considers Section 14 of the Act:s as controlling.
If this dictum becomes the established rule, its presumable effect will be to
make the practice under Section 75 similar to that under general bankruptcy,
and to render the provision of paragraph 5 nugatory, for even in general
bankruptcy practically the only relief barred by a previous discharge is another
discharge within six years.30
32. Pearce v. Coller, 92 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 745
(1938); Hostetter v. New York Joint Stock Land Bank, 84 F. (2d) 389 (C. C. A. 3d,
1936); see In re Reichert, 13 F. Supp. 1, 7 (NV. D. Ky. 1936); (1937) 37 COL. L R-rv.
1101. But in the Eighth Circuit mere proof that a debtor was proceeding under Section
74 (providing for compositions and extensions) does not without more preclude relief
under Section 75. Summers v. Collector of Taxes of Scotland County, 34 Am. B. R.
(.,.s.) 24, 34 Am. B. R. (x.s.) 728, 92 F. (2d) 819 (C. C. A. Sth, 1937).
33. See Pearce v. Coller, 92 F. (2d) 237, 238 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937).
34. See In re Reichert, 13 F. Supp. 1, 7 (WV. D. Ky. 1936).
35. In re Reichert, 13 F. Supp. 1 (W. D. Ky. 1936); In re McIntyre, 17 F. Supp.
914 (NV. D. Pa. 1936).
36. In re McIntyre, 17 F. Supp. 914 (W. D. Pa. 1936) ; see In re 'Moss, 21 F. Supp.
1019, 1020 (E. D. Ill. 1938).
37. See In re 'cIntyre, 17 F. Supp. 914, 916 (W. D. Pa. 1936).
38. "The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has . . .
within six years prior to bankruptcy been granted a discharge." 32 STAT. 797 (1903),
11 U. S. C. § 32 (1934).
39. Of course, it must be remembered that whereas the discharge is the main and
immediate object of the debtor in a general bankruptcy proceeding, under Section 75
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The other portions of paragraph 5, which attempted to avert the effect of the
Radford case4 0 by providing that petitions dismissed because of that decision
"be promptly reinstated," have met a similar fate. If they were designed to
restore the status quo before the Radford decision, they have not accomplished
their purpose. It has been held that those who acquired rights in the debtor's
property during the interregnum when there was no Frazier-Lemke Act could
not be divested of those rights thereafter, whether they were acquired by fore-
closure,41 by contract, 42 or even by misrepresentation.4 3 And the majority
of courts held that the debtor must take some positive action to get his
proceeding reinstated 4 4 though just what that action should be was never
settled.4 5 On March 3, 1938, the Act was amended to cover cases dismissed
by the lower courts under the impression that the new Frazier-Lemke Act
was unconstitutional ;40 but even this amendment seems to have been of no
avail.4 7 The debtor most immediately threatened by foreclosure is apparently
the one Congress is least able to protect from the effect of the invalidation
of the statute, despite its best efforts to that end.
While these difficulties will disappear with time, and the problem of a
transfer from general bankruptcy will become much less acute as the con-
stitutionality of Section 75 becomes settled and the debtor is enabled to elect
it is only an incident to the three year stay and subsequent retention of the property by
the debtor. Hence, the denial of a second discharge is not there so serious.
40. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
41. Shreiner v. Farmers' Trust Co., 91 F. (2d) 606 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937) ; DuBose
v. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank, 83 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) ; Barton
v. Gelman, 91 F. (2d) 548 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937) ; cf. It re Leinweber, 95 F. (2d) 240
(C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
42. Rehmeyer v. First National Bank of New Freedom, 84 F, (2d) 194 (C. C. A.
3d, 1936).
43. In re Byerly, 20 F. Supp. 762 (S. D. Ohio 1937). Such a claim of misrepresenta-
tion could be tested only in a plenary suit and not in the bankruptcy proceeding. In re
Merritt, 19 F. Supp. 112 (N. D. Cal. 1937).
44. In re Suzuki, 20 F. Supp. 900 (S. D. Cal. 1937) ; In re Byerly, 20 F. Supp. 762
(S. D. Ohio 1937). But cf. It re Oyler, 20 F. Supp. 595 (S. D. Ohio 1936). In In re
Leinweber, 95 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), it was held that the failure of the
debtor to reinstate "promptly" may, with other things, constitute laches and et.oppel
when he does file a petition.
45. Compare In re Oyler, 20 F. Supp. 595 (S. D. Ohio 1936), and In re Archibald,
14 F. Supp. 437 (D. Afinn. 1936), with Diller v. Shoemaker, 90 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937). See Hearings, p. 64, for account of another procedure.
46. 52 STAT. 84 (1938).
47. Reber v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 96 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); cf.
MeVilliams v. Blackard, 96 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), where although there was
no question of third parties' rights involved the court refused to reinstate on the ground
that an erroneous decision not appealed was res judicata. The court was apparently
unaware that the statute had been specifically amended to prevent such a result. In the
Reber case the statute is not mentioned, but the court rests on the ground of vested rights
in third parties much as did the courts which refused to reinstate actions under the
unamended statute.
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the proper remedy in the first place, there are other more permanent judicial
obstacles to farm debt relief with which Congress has not yet dealt. Among
these is the rule that in some cases the dismissal of one proposal for com-
position and extension will be res judicata as to succeeding proposals. In its
application this restriction may not be unreasonably harsh on the debtor. As
laid down by the Ninth Circuit, the rule is that the creditor seeking dismissal
of the new petition must sustain the burden of proof that no change in the
debtor's position has occurred sufficient to justify a new proceeding.49 A
district court in California has held, however, that where the original petition
was abandoned by the debtor the new petition must show on its face a change
sufficient to preclude dismissal.49 And a Minnesota district court has gone
so far as to rule all dismissals res judicatarO-a harsh and unnecessarily com-
prehensive doctrine, especially since it results from a case involving seemingly
innocuous action on the part of the debtor.5 It is to be hoped that the Ninth
Circuit rule will be recognized as desirable in cases where the original peti-
tion is dismissed for lack of good faith. If the debtor can float a loan or
otherwise improve his prospects, he should be permitted to try again to effect
a composition, or to persuade the court that he is capable of rehabilitation.
And even in the case where the original petition has been abandoned, no great
hardship will be worked by extending the Ninth Circuit rule so as to require
the creditor to show why the debtor should not be permitted a second attempt.02
The courts seem to be somewhat fearful of the specter of a debtor filing peti-
tion after petition, with an automatic stay accompanying each one, and thus
holding off his creditors ad infinitum. Such a remote contingency, if it actually
occurred, could presumably be met with injunctive relief.
Probably the most disliked and most sweeping bit of judicial interpretation
has been the expansion of the "good faith" requirement of subsection 75(i)
into the largest single barrier to relief under the act.0 Section 75 provides,
briefly, that a proposal for the composition and extension of the farmer's debts
shall be confirmed by the court if filed "in good faith, and not .
made or procured except as herein provided, or by any means, promises, or
acts herein forbidden"; if presenting an "equitable and feasible method
48. Howell v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 92 F. (2d) 703 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937);
Lemm v. Northern California National Bank, 93 F. (2d) 709 (C. C. A. 9th. 1937).
49. In re Suzuki, 20 F. Supp. 900 (S. D. Cal. 1937).
50. In re Archibald, 14 F. Supp. 437 (D. Minn. 1926).
51. The debtor had failed to reach an agreement with his creditors, omitted to amend,
and then filed a new petition. The failure to amend occurred during the interregnum
between the Radford decision and the amended act of Aug. 28, 1935, and was presumably
due to the then extreme uncertainty of the law.
52. The Seventh Circuit has recently ruled that a voluntary dismissal of the first
petition will be no bar to a second. In. re Armold, 100 F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
The court apparently did not consider the objections raised in the other cases. It is to
be noted that this case and the cases cited notes 48-50 supra, when chronologically
arranged, show steadily increasing leniency.
53. See Hearings, particularly the testimony of William Lemke and Elmer McClain.
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of liquidation for secured creditors and of financial rehabilitation for the
farmer"; and if accepted by a majority, in number and amount, of the
creditors.54 Subsection (s), the Frazier-Lemke Act, provides that a debtor
who fails to get the consent of his creditors, or is aggrieved by the plan to
which they consent, may amend his petition, be adjudged bankrupt, and then
be entitled to a three-year stay of all proceedings against his farm property,
within certain limits. It is questionable whether the "good faith" provision
of subsection (i) was meant ever to refer to circumstances other than those
conjunctively mentioned, plus fraud and misrepresentation; but at least it
seems certain that the "good faith" requirement was not intended to apply
to procedings under subsection (s).r 5 The debtor was to be given "the
absolute legal right to amend"5 0G his petition and enjoy the three year stay:
Yet the courts have almost uniformly denied him both the power to amend
and the benefits of the moratorium, where the original composition proposal
was not made in "good faith,"5 7 a term which has been variously and in some
cases very strictly interpreted. While the Supreme Court has never expressly
approved or disapproved this "good faith" requirement, a note to Mr. Tustice
Brandeis' opinion in Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank,5 9
where the present subsection (s) was held constitutional, states the doctrine
concisely. But foes of the doctrine deny that this note constitutes approval
by the Court,5 9 and at least it would not conclude the Court were the issue
to be directly presented.
Even were the Supreme Court to rule that the debtor has unlimited power
to amend his petition to come under subsection (s), the barrier to the farmer's
relief would not necessarily be removed. The Court in the Wright case inter-
preted the statute as giving the courts discretionary power to terminate the
three year stay at any time. ° There has been apparent in recent cases a
tendency to employ as standards in the exercise of that discretion the standards
54. § 75(g), (i).
55. See Hearings, pp. 5-7, 190.
56. See Brief of William Lemke for Appellant, p. 12, Bender v. Federal Farm
Mortgage Corp., 99 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
57. Apparently the only cases contra have been In re Moser, 95 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A.
9th, 1938), and Bartels v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 100 F. (2d) 813
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938). The latter decision, however, was handed down on the same day
as an exactly contrary decision by the same court, sitting with a differently composed
bench. In re Henderson, 100 F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). Moreover, it is
not clear from the language of the Moser case whether the decision-that the question
of good faith is moot when the debtor amends to come under subsection (s)-affectq
substance or procedure. If the latter, it may still be possible for the creditor to have
the proceedings dismissed for want of good faith, at least in jurisdictions where he may
move for dismissal at any time. See cases cited infra, notes 78, 79.
58. 300 U. S. 440, 462 n. (1937).
59. See Brief of William Lemke for Appellant, Bender v. Federal Farm Mortgage
Corp., 99 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
60. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 462 (1937).
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of dismissal laid down in the "good faith" cases."' Indeed, the above mentioned
footnote to the WVright case may be read to suggest such a transfer of stand-
ards. Since it can be of little concern to the farmer whether his petition is
"dismissed for lack of good faith" or his stay terminated immediately after
adjudication, it seems that any attempt to rectify the present situation should
be directed not toward abolishing the "good faith" rule as applied to sub-
section (s), but toward relaxing and defining the standards of good faith.
The present range of judicial rulings on good faith is wide. The farmer
in northern Texas -0 2 or eastern Illinois,0 3 it appears, is entitled to his flree
year stay as long as he can keep up the farm and pay into court a rental,
equivalent to the customary rental in the locality, from which the taxes can
be met and some interest paid to the creditor. His brother in North Dakota,"
on the other hand, has been refused the benefits of the act unless he presents
a definite, unconditional, and feasible plan for payment in full of his secured
debts. Between these extremes lie several intermediate positions. One of the
more frequent is that which denies to the debtor the privilege of petitioning
for relief under Section 75(s) where the composition and extension proposal
refused by his creditors was obviously less favorable to them than the Section
75(s) proceedings would be. The argument is to the effect that sub-
section (s) was merely an inducement to creditors to accept the composition
proposal, the main object of Section 75 being to foster agreements between
debtor and creditor. 0 Consequently a debtor who attempts to short-cut sub-
sections (a) through (r) by putting forward an unacceptable proposal is
acting in bad faith and will be turned out of court. This seems a fair enough
requirement, if objective standards are employed to determine whether the
debtor's offer is one which could reasonably have been accepted. But the
framers of the act apparently did not intend that the mere inadequacy of a
proposal should furnish grounds for dismissal of the entire action."- Sub-
section (s), with its three year stay, was'thought of as the debtor's principal
remedy; the preceding subsections were retained in order that ill will between
debtor and creditor might be avoided by inducing the creditor to consent to
61. E.g., In re Dandy, 23 F. Supp. 361 (WN. D. S. C. 1938); In re Andersin, 22 F.
Supp. 928 (D. N. D. 1938); In rc Reynolds, 21 F. Supp. 369 (D. Okla. 1937).
62. In re Slaughter, 12 F. Supp. 206 (N. D. Tex. 1935). rev'd on fIt iacr slhowimn of
facts, 13 F. Supp. 893 (N. D. Tex. 1936); cf. In re Bumpass, 23 F. Supp. 876 (N. D.
Tex. 1938). The latter case did not arise on the point of good faith, but tends never-
theless to show the standards required of the debtor.
63. In re Anderson, 23 F. Supp. 854 (E. D. Ill. 1938).
64. Bender v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 99 F. (2d) 2 52 (C.C. A. 8th, 1938).
65. Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, 92 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. th. 1937); see
In re Palmer, 21 F. Supp. 628, 632 (D. N. D. 1937) ; In re Vater, 14 F. Supp. 31. 632
(11T. D. Ky. 1936) ; In re Hilliker, 9 F. Supp. 948, 950 (S. D. Cal. 1935).
66. See Baxter v. Savings Bank of Utica, 92 F. (2d) 404, 406 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
67. See Hearings, pp. 5-7, 190.
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a voluntary composition. Congress, perhaps, has only itself to blame if its
words have been misinterpreted in this instance; yet the almost incredible
declaration of one court, that the announced indisposition of the farmer's
creditors to consider any composition proposal required the dismissal of the
proceedings for want of good faith on the part of the farmer,09 reveals the
unreasonable extent to which the "inducement" theory can be carried.
A second rule which emerges with some clarity is the holding of many courts
that the debtor to show his "good faith" must present a plan of rehabilitation
which is definite and unconditional. 70 The submission of plans contingent
upon securing loans from banks,71 or upon other refinancing arrangements
which are not certain, is considered unsatisfactory. This standard, it seems,
could be used to throw the debtor out of court, on the ground that he is unable
to refinance himself, even if the "good faith" requirement were no longer
enforced as a bar to adjudication; but no matter how it is employed it seems
contrary to the legislative intent. Since the purpose of Section 75 was to
shield the farmer from the worst effects of the depression, he should be allowed
the full three years in which to arrange his loans, instead of being forced to do
so at the height of the emergency which necessitated the moratorium.
Here, of course, the act treads upon the borderland of constitutionality.
It was formerly thought that an out-and-out moratorium is beyond the power
of Congress, although there are no express holdings on the point ;7,- and the
amended Frazier-Lemke Act has been justified instead as an exercise of the
bankruptcy power.7 3 It is possible that the courts which have promulgated
the rule that the debtor's proposal must be unconditional have done so from
an unexpressed belief that a delay without a definite plan of rehabilitation
would be unconstitutional. If so, the point should be clarified and settled.
By far the most general criterion of good faith is that the debtor must
propose an "equitable and feasible method of liquidation for secured creditors,"
68. Evidence that the composition proceeding was not the main object of the amended
act is to be found in the provision that the debtor may amend despite the conset of his
creditors to a composition plan if he is "aggrieved" by it.
69. See Knotts v. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank, 86 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A.
4th, 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 660 (1937). The statement, however, was merely a
dictum thrown out in the process of holding the act unconstitutional.
70. See I re Dionne, 21 F. Supp. 311, 313 (D. Me. 1937) ; In re Borgelt, 10 F. Supp,
113, 117 (S. D. Ill. 1935), aff'd, 79 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); c/. Masnsey v.
Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 94 F. (2d) 526 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938)
In re Byrd, 15 F. Supp. 453 (D. Md. 1936). But see In re Kleve, C. C. H. BANcln. Srnv.
3406 (D. Minn. 1935).
71. In re Buxton's Estate, 14 F. Supp. 616 (E. D. Ill. 1936).
72. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 597, 598 (1935)
In re Slaughter, 13 F. Supp. 893, 894 (N. D. Tex. 1935) ; ef. In re Lowmon, 79 F. (2d)
887, 891 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), overruled by Wright v. Union Central Life Inq. C-,, 304
U. S. 502 (1938).
73. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440 (1937).
"Whether, in view of the emergency, an absolute stay of three years would have been
justified under the bankruptcy power, we have no occasion to decide." Id. at p, 460.
[Vol. 48: 859
1939] JUDICIAL BARRIERS TO FARM DEBT RELIEF 869
as well as "of financial rehabilitation" for himself. Within this general nle,
however, variation again appears in the interpretation of "liquidation" and
"rehabilitation."'7 4 M1any courts, dismissing petitions curtly for failure to
present such a plan, have not made clear in their published opinions what
constitutes "liquidation" for secured creditors." Similarly Mr. Justice Bran-
deis, in the Wright case, fails to discuss the point. Among the courts which
have been more definite, three schools of thought have grown up. First come
the courts which hold or otherwise indicate that the debtor must have some
"equity" in the property to assure the creditor that the latter's three-year wait
shall not be a mere delay.70 Whether Congress did in fact intend that the
stay should benefit the creditor as well as the debtor is doubtful, but in any
case the standard is objectionable in that it lacks clarity. And if the mysterious
"equity" be defined to mean an excess of assets over liabilities, as it has been
in some cases, 77 then the standard seems unduly strict. To require that the
debtor own more than he owes is a strange requirement for what is at least
labelled a "bankruptcy" proceeding.
The second rule is that which provides that the debtor must show a prospec-
tive ability to pay the appraised value of his farm, at the scheduled time if it
is his composition proposal which is challenged, or at the end of three years
if he is seeking relief under subsection (s).-8 This requirement is based on
the statutory necessity of paying the appraised value within the three year
period if the farmer is to retain the farm, but may work injustice in the diffi-
culty of proving a prediction of future events. The third and by far the
majority rule is that the proceedings must contemplate repayment of the
secured creditor in full. 79 The justification for this is the statutory privilege
of the secured creditor to demand a judicial sale of the security and to bid
as high as he wishes at the sale instead of accepting payment of the appraised
74. See cases cited infra nctes 76-79. The problem is well discugsed in In re Ander-
son. 22 F. Supp. 928 (D. N. D. 1938). (1938) 23 M xx. L. REv. 371, and Ih re Anderson,
23 F. Supp. 854, 856 (E. D. Ill. 1938).
75. E.g., In re Davis, 22 F. Supp. 12 (N. D. Iowa 1938).
76. See In re Davis, 16 F. Supp. 960, 961 (N. D. Tex. 1936) ; It re Antder. ,n, 22 F.
Supp. 928, 933 (D. N. D. 1938).
77. See Pearce v. Coller, 92 F. (2d) 237, 239 (C. C..A. 3d, 1937); In re 'McGrew.
23 F. Supp. 159, 160 (f. D. Pa. 1937) ; In re Reynolds, 21 F. Supp. 369, 371 1WN. D.
Okla. 1937). If the requirement is that of a present or potential equity, as in Cowhcrrd
i% Phoenix joint Stock Land Bank, 99 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), then of courre
it is equivalent to a requirement that the debt Fe eventually paid in full. See ntes
79, 80, infra.
78. lit re Anderson, 23 F. Supp. 854 (E. D. Ill. 1938); see Doak v. Federal Land
Bank of Baltimore, 99 F. (2d) 145, 146 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938). cert. denied. 59 Sup Ct.
253 (1938) ; In re Reaney, C. C. H. B.Ax.. Sar. f' 51,342 (AV. D. Pa. 193S); c. In re
Anderson, 22 F. Supp. 928 (D. N. D. 1938).
79. Cowherd v. Phoenix Joirt Stock Land Bank, 99 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933 ;
Lemm v. Northern California National Bank, 93 F, (2d) 709 (C. C. A. 90h, 1937) ; In re
Borgelt, 79 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) ; In re Sdcaeffer, 14 F. Supp. 897 (D. Md.
1936); In re Erickson, 18 F. Supp. 439 (N%. D. Mich. 1936).
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value. The argument runs that since he may bid up to the full amount owed
him, the debtor must be prepared to pay in full."0
A choice between these three rules must be made with an eye to the threat
of unconstitutionality. A reading of the Radford opinion creates the impression
that the debt must be paid in full.8 ' The Wright case, on the other hanud,
seems to indicate that the bankruptcy power will support the scaling down
of the mortgagor's obligation to the value of the security, and that any relief
to the mortgagor is permissible provided the security remains unharmed."-
Since the security may never again bring the price at which it was mortgaged',
and since it does not seem incompatible with the theory of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings to ask the creditor to bear the loss, the desirable standard would
seem to be that of eventual ability to pay the appraised value, as presunably
distinguished both from the amount of the mortgage debt and from the stun
that could be realized by immediate foreclosure. If it is constitutionally neces-
sary that the prospective ability of the debtor to raise that stum be found before
he should be entitled to relief, at least the burden should be on the creditor to
refute that prospective ability.
It is apparent that the farmer who falls under the jurisdiction of one of
the stricter district courts has small hope of relief. Prior to 1938, the dis-
tinction between "controversies in bankruptcy", reviewable as of right both
as to questions of fact and law,8 3 and "proceedings in bankruptcy", reviewable
only by permission and only as to questions of law,8 4 was so applied in most
cases as to limit the farmer's opportunity to appeal, on the ground that dis-
missal of his petition was a mere "proceeding". 8 5 And good faith was appar-
80. Cf. Cowherd v. Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank, 99 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 8th.
1938). It has been suggested that a bid of more than the value of the security would not
only be foolishness but bad faith on the part of the creditor (Hearings, pp. 7--8) ; hilt the
suggestion has not been well received by the courts. See In re Anderson, 22 F. Supp,
928, 936 (D. N. D. 1938).
81. Most of the courts taking the strict view of rehabilitation rely strongly (n the
Radford case. See, e.g., Cowherd v. Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank, 99 F. (2d) 225
(C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
82. See Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 466-4,8
(1937). For discussions of the act's effect and purpose, see Adair v. Bank of America,
303 U. S. 350, 354-357 (1938), and Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 5012.
514-518 (1938).
83. 30 STAT. 553 (1898), as amended, 43 STAT. 936 (1925), 11 U. S. C. §48 (1934).
84. 30 STAT. 553 (1898), as amended, 43 STAT. 936 (1925), 11 U.S.C. §47 (1934).
85. Dismissal after the filing of the amended petition was generally a "proceeding."
In re Combs, 88 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); In re Hargrove, 96 F. (2d) log
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938); Griffith v. Equitable Assurance Society, 91 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A.
8th, 1937). But compare Knotts v. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank, 86 F. (2d)
551 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) (dismissal before amended petition appealable by right), with
Raentsch v. American Co., 82 F. (2d) 770 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) (such dismNsqals not
appealable by right in absence of express request for adjudication) ; Cowherd v. Phoenix
Joint Stock Land Bank, 94 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 8th. 1938) (no request necessary).
Before the Frazier-Lemke Act was amended in 1935. the filing of the original petition
was generally held to be the time after which dismissals were mere "proceedings."
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ently a question of fact, supposedly not reviewable on a permissive appeal.8 l
The Chandler _Act has remedied that state of affairs by making all appeals
alike,8 7 but the reluctance of the courts to grant appeals in forma pauperis
has been assailed as in effect denying the farmer the right of appeal.83 More-
over, a foreclosure or other disposal of the property pending the appeal ap-
parently makes the latter moot.s2
The farmer who can pass the "good faith" barrier, on the other hand, seems
to be fairly safe for the duration of his three years. The statute provides that
"if the debtor is unable to refinance himself within three years" the court may"
terminate the stay;90 and the Supreme Court has interpreted this power as
within the court's discretion to exercise at any time.01 But except where the
stay has been "terminated at the outset" for failure to present a definite plan
of rehabilitation, the courts have been somewhat reluctant to exercise their
admitted discretion. Only where the debtor has not paid the prescribed rental -2
or where he has obviously exceeded the bounds of propriety, as by attempting
to sell the property to an innocent purchaser, 3 or by abandoning farming for
real estate subdivision, 4 will the court expel him from possession.
The judicially created obstacles to farm debt relief noted above must be
held responsible in no "small degree for the charges of ineffectiveness hurled
against Section 75.95 One estimate has fixed the number of those farmers
Wilkerson v. Cooch, 78 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); In re Harris, 78 F. (2d) 849
(C. C.A. 9th, 1935).
86. In Augustyn v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 87 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 7th,
1937), good faith was held to be a question of fact under the parallel and almost identi-
cally worded subsection of § 74. This was followed in O'Connor v. Mills, 90 F. (2d) 66 5,
666 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937), as to a much less similar phrasing in § 77B. The point haIs
never been directly raised under § 75. The circuit courts have not been averse to discu s-
ing the facts of the cases, but on the other hand they have almost always sustained the
district courts where good faith w. as the point in issue. In the absence of evidence in te
record on good faith, a presumption favors the finding of the district court Bank oif
Eureka v. Partington, 91 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
87. 52 STAT. 854 (1938), 11 U.S. C. A. § 47 (Supp. 1938). It has been suggested
that the distinction still persists with regard to interlocutory orders. See WnrsvTF.ix.
THE BANKRupTCy LAW oF 193S (1938) 66.
88. See Hearings, pp. 8-9, 68-69, 93.
89. Noll v. Union Joint Stock Land Bank, 84 F. (2d) 56S (C. C. A. 3d, 1936).
90. 49 STAT. 942 (1935); 11 U.S.C. §203(s)(3) (Supp. 1936).
91. See Wright v. Vinton Branch of fountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 462 (19371.
92. it re Chilton, 18 F. Supp. 937 (D. Colo. 1939). In such a case the statute
expressly permits termination. § 75(s) (3). There is no equity of redemption after such
a sale. In re Chilton, supra.
93. It re Prudhomme, 24 F. Supp. 155 (W. D. La. 1938).
94. In re Farr, 23 F. Supp. 945 (W. D. S. C. 1938) ; cf. In re Maricelli, 24 F. Supp.
66 (W. D. La. 1938) (farmer getting deeper in debt).
One court, however, has denied that it possesses any power of terminaton within the
three years. In re McIntyre, 23 F. Supp. 343 (XV. D. Pa. 1938).
95. See Hearings, especially statements of Peyton R. Evans, pp. 75-133, and Jacob I.
Weinstein, pp. 14-43.
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who between August 28, 1935, and December 15, 1937, were actually able
to avail themselves of subsection (s) at 00.003%, or less than seventy-five
farmers, of the 2,350,000 with mortgaged farmsY0 While this calculation of
course does not take into account the compositions arrived at, whether in or
out of court, under the threat of an imminent proceeding under subsection
(s) ,7 there is no doubt that the act has not been as widely invoked as its
framers expected. 8 In such a situation it is not altogether easy to determine
whether the strictness of the courts has excluded too many debtors, or whether
the failure of all but the chronically impecunious to apply has brought about
the strict decisions; but the facts seem to support the former view. The causes
behind the harshness and confusion of the courts can only be a matter of
conjecture. Obviously excessive care to avoid the pitfalls of unconstitution-
ality,99 and hasty draftsmanship of the statute, resulting in ambiguous wording,
have been responsible for a great deal of the difficulty. But some of the causes
of irritation are more fundamental. For example, the failure of paragraph 5
of subsection (s) to achieve its apparent object of restoring the status quo
before the invalidation of the Frazier-Lemke Act must be laid to a collision
of the legislative intent with the settled practices of the common law with
regard to rights which have once vested. Another potent source of trouble
has been the conflict between the notions of liquidation and conservation. Sec-
tion 75 has been created and sustained as a bankruptcy proceeding, not an
equity receivership or a moratorium;100 but some unexpressed remnant of
such a theory must account for the requirements of eventual debt satisfaction,
or of the presence of some "equity" over and above liabilities, which have
been enforced in some cases. Finally, there has been the ancient judicial sin
of laying down rules too broad for the facts of the particular case. This has
been particularly apparent in some of the good faith cases, where the courts
seemingly suspected actual skullduggery on the part of particular debtors, and
swept them out of court with a broom so large as to catch innocent debtors
thereafter.
None of these difficulties is insuperable. A clear, definitive exposition of
the law, both as to fundamental theory and as to practical details of operation,
96. Statement of Peyton R. Evans, General Counsel, Farm Credit Administration.
Hearings, p. 87.
97. See Hearings, pp. 165-183.
98. As of June, 1937, 14,899 petitions had been filed under § 75; 8,864 had been diqo
missed; 3,852 were then pending; and only 2,183 had proceeded to a conclusion. Hearings,
p. 12. For later statistics, see pp. 201-203; for a more detailed analysis, see pp. 38-42,
99. Indeed, it may almost be said that the existence of the good faith rule ig due
to the interpretation of the statute, but that its harshness and unpopularity are due ti, the
interpretation of the Constitution.
100. See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502, 515-518 (1938)
Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 469-470, "The procee,l[
ings under . .. Section 75 . .. are not the equivalents of equity receivership proceed-
ings." In re Sterba, 74 F. (2d) 413, 417 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
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is not beyond the capacity of the Supreme Court. The act is now set to
expire in 1940, but it is quite likely that it, or some similar measure, will
be in operation an indefinite number of years. That it is labelled an emer-
gency measure will not necessarily prevent its extension as long as the evil
whose threat it was designed to check continues.101 And the menace of farm
tenancy in this country continues to grow. In 1880 one fourth of American
farmers were tenants; in 1900 one third; in 1930 almost one half.102 It is
most important that the Supreme Court bring clarity and uniformity and,
above all, sympathy with its purposes to the administration of Section 75.
Without this no efforts of Congress can succeed.
101. See (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 124.
102. 2 MoRisoN AND CO-MMAGER, GRoWirn OF THE AmEnicAz. R P mic (1938) 204.
